The unexpected $30 billion trade truce between the United States and China, framed publicly as an effort toward strategic stability, masks an expedient arrangement that fails to resolve core structural conflicts. Critical minerals, AI governance, and intellectual property remain key friction points in the relationship. Rather than genuine reconciliation, the agreement reflects short-term domestic pressures. Washington seeks tariff relief to ease cost-of-living inflation ahead of high-stakes November 2026 midterm elections, while Beijing aims to prop up its sluggish export economy without undertaking difficult domestic structural reforms.

Market Displacement and Multilateral Erosion

For middle powers, this bilateral alignment creates severe commercial and structural vulnerabilities. Canada is a case in point. In a constrained Chinese market with muted consumer demand, state-mandated purchase quotas and preferential tariff concessions on American agricultural, forestry, and energy exports directly crowd out Canadian producers. Beyond immediate market displacement, the deal erodes the multilateral, rules-based trading system that shields smaller economies from unilateral coercion. This vulnerability was demonstrated by China’s punitive trade restrictions against Canada following the 2018 Meng Wanzhou arrest.

A major contributor to this erosion is Washington’s persistent narrative that it disproportionately shoulders global governance burdens. This ignores the billions committed by allies to support rules-based governance. Canada has invested $2.8 billion, the European Union $35 billion, and Australia $4.6 billion to strengthen critical mineral supply chains and counter Chinese export controls.

Vulnerability to Bilateral Coercion

Superpower unilateralism also forces middle powers into unequal arrangements while suppressing domestic investment through uncertainty in trade relations. Recent pressures, including stalled CUSMA negotiations over U.S. attempts to curtail Canadian trade agreements with third nations, alongside targeted Chinese export controls, demonstrate that superpower coercion is at its peak in bilateral settings and dilutes only when smaller economies act collectively.

Strategic Diversification Beyond Superpowers

Middle powers cannot afford to preserve a legacy U.S.-centric framework as their sole trading pillar. Instead, they must actively institutionalize trade diversification. This includes expanding regional pacts like the CPTPP, pursuing regulatory harmonization between major blocs following the EU-Mercosur precedent, and maximizing agreements like CETA. The strategic objective is not to abandon the American market, but to establish sufficient independent, rules-based trade options to negotiate with superpowers from a position of collective strength and political autonomy.

By Farshid Keramat

Editor’s Note: This article is a condensed policy digest. The original, full-length analysis was published by the Tessera Institute for Global Affairs. Read the complete article here.

Global Health Security in Africa

As Western governments reduce foreign aid, that imbalance is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. The question is no longer simply how Africa will replace lost funding, but how the current situation will redefine health as an issue of sovereignty and foreign policy. At stake is a broader renegotiation of who sets Africa’s health priorities, who finances them, and how international partnerships support them.

For more than three decades, external donors financed vaccination campaigns, disease surveillance, HIV treatment, maternal health programmes, and emergency outbreak responses across the continent. This support saved millions of lives, yet it also created long-term dependence on external financing, imported medical products, and donor-driven priorities. It is imperative that Africa reconsider its approach to health funding by building domestic resilience to protect its health sovereignty.

A Global Health Financing Model Under Strain

The current funding crisis reflects a broader shift in international politics. The United States has suspended large portions of foreign aid, while several European governments have also reduced development assistance as resources shift toward domestic priorities, defence, migration, and geopolitical competition. These cuts come as African countries continue responding to recurring outbreaks of Ebola, mpox, cholera, Marburg virus disease (MVD), and malaria while managing rising debt that limits public spending.

This is more than a humanitarian funding crisis. It exposes a longstanding weakness in the global health system. Critical aspects of Africa’s health security—including financing, procurement, and pharmaceutical supply chains—remain vulnerable to political decisions made outside the continent. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated these risks as African countries experienced delayed access to vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics. Those vulnerabilities remain today, with Africa continuing to import more than 90% of its supplies in medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, and other essential medical products.

Within this changing funding environment, the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has evolved beyond its original mandate of disease surveillance and emergency response. Representing 55 member states, it increasingly serves as the African Union’s principal public health institution, coordinating preparedness, supporting regional policy alignment, and strengthening Africa’s voice in global health governance. Instead of viewing declining foreign aid solely as a crisis, the organization is using this moment as an opportunity to advance a broader agenda centred on health sovereignty.

The expanding role of Africa CDC reflects both necessity and strategic choices as new funding realities place greater responsibility on African governments and regional institutions. With this increased responsibility come possible risks; without sustainable domestic financing and stronger national health systems, greater institutional responsibility could reveal itself as short-term substitution for lost external funding rather than a durable shift toward health sovereignty.

Greater African ownership does not mean isolation from the international health system. Health sovereignty should not be equated with self-sufficiency. For African governments and institutions such as Africa CDC, the goal is to strengthen their ability to set health priorities and exercise greater control over health systems, while maintaining international partnerships. This approach allows cooperation with donor nations to reinforce African-defined priorities rather than determine them. In this sense, health is no longer viewed solely as a development issue, but increasingly as a strategic asset linked to economic resilience, political stability, diplomatic influence, and regional security.

The Path to a New Framework

Advancing this vision will depend on progress across three interconnected priorities. First, governments should increase domestic investment. As external assistance becomes less predictable, greater domestic investment offers African governments an opportunity to strengthen health sovereignty by reducing their exposure to shifting donor priorities and exercising greater control over how health resources are allocated. Although African leaders committed through the Abuja Declaration to allocate 15% of national expenditure to health, only three countries currently meet this target.

Second, health financing should be more diversified to make health systems more resilient. Africa CDC has proposed expanding health insurance, introducing solidarity levies, mobilizing diaspora investment, and strengthening public-private partnerships to reduce dependence on traditional aid. One proposal is to explore how voluntary mechanisms—such as diaspora health bonds and direct health insurance contributions—could leverage a portion of the US$95 billion sent home annually to support national health priorities. Public-private partnerships can similarly combine public resources and priorities with private capital and expertise; South Africa’s Biovac Institute, for example, uses such a model to support domestic vaccine production.

Finally, Africa should produce more of what its healthcare systems need. Investments in pharmaceutical manufacturing, laboratory capacity, and disease surveillance are strategic tools for economic resilience and political autonomy. Still, greater self-reliance does not eliminate the need for international partnerships. During the 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak, for instance, the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund provided $220.6 million in emergency aid to support regional containment and cross-border coordination. This demonstrates that strengthening African health systems is an investment in global security, not just an African priority.

Health Sovereignty Requires More Than Financing

Rising debt, limited fiscal capacity, corruption, procurement inefficiencies, and the misallocation of public resources continue to undermine health systems in many African countries. Simply replacing donor funding with domestic financing will not strengthen health security, unless governments also improve transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. International partnerships will therefore remain essential, but they must reinforce African priorities rather than determine them.

The real test is not whether aid will decline—that trend is already underway—but whether African governments can pair greater ownership of health with stronger governance. Health sovereignty will ultimately depend not only on who finances health systems, but on how transparently, effectively, and accountably those resources are managed. In an increasingly fragmented world, the countries best prepared for the next pandemic are not those that receive the most aid, but those that build institutions capable of thriving when it is no longer guaranteed.

About the Author

Raquel Jakac is a Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs candidate at the University of British Columbia whose work and research interests span global health, human rights, foreign policy, and international security.

Editor’s Note: This article is part of the Emerging Leaders Series, featuring exceptional early-career international relations professionals whose fresh perspectives shape debates on critical global priorities.

Middle powers like Canada, Germany, and Brazil are caught in an escalating geopolitical vice. As protectionist sentiment in Washington creates new trade barriers, middle powers face growing pressure to seek alternative markets. However, reflexively pivoting toward Beijing carries significant strategic risks. China currently holds a near-monopoly on critical mineral processing, controlling over 90 percent of global battery-grade graphite and rare earth elements. Trading economic reliance on the United States for strategic dependence on China does not deliver autonomy; it merely exchanges one vulnerability for another.

The $3.4 Trillion AfCFTA Alternative

The true, sustainable off-ramp for middle powers lies across the Atlantic by deepening strategic trade partnerships with African economies. Long relegated to the periphery of Western foreign policy or viewed through the outdated lens of foreign aid, the African continent is undergoing a massive structural transformation. Driven by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the region represents a $3.4 trillion economic ecosystem encompassing 1.4 billion people. Macroeconomic fundamentals across the continent are quietly strengthening, with projected continental GDP growth of 4.5 percent and cooling inflation rates that are comparable to many developed countries. For middle powers looking to diversify exports in green technology, agri-food, and automotive components, the AfCFTA offers an unprecedented institutional entry point.

De-risking the Mineral Supply Chain

Beyond general trade, African engagement addresses the critical mineral choke point head-on. Western-backed initiatives like the Lobito Corridor—a 2,100-kilometer rail line connecting resource-rich regions in central Africa to Atlantic ports—demonstrate how targeted infrastructure investment can offer a direct alternative to legacy Chinese supply lines. By co-investing in African extraction and local processing capacities, middle powers can secure the raw materials necessary for the green transition without exposure to Chinese state-directed leverage.

A Calculated Economic Imperative

For middle powers to navigate an increasingly fragmented global order, they must reframe their foreign policy approach. Engaging African nations is not a gesture of diplomatic goodwill; it is a calculated economic necessity. By forging equal, commercial partnerships across the continent, middle powers can build supply chain resilience, diversify their export markets, and secure the true strategic autonomy they urgently need.

By Farshid Keramat

Editor’s Note: This article is a condensed policy digest. The original, full-length analysis was published by the Tessera Institute for Global Affairs. Read the complete article here.

It is evident that the world is changing. The strategic withdrawal by the United States from the global rules‑based system has raised new questions about the future of global governance. Most nations continue to hold on to the principles of global collaboration, and for good reason. The existing system has allowed for unparalleled economic growth in the post–World War II era through free trade. Can the rules‑based system survive? I believe the existing global governance structure can be preserved through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‑Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

The CPTPP: A Shield and a Standard‑Setter

The CPTPP is one of the most sophisticated trade agreements in the world, encompassing free trade in goods and services, robust intellectual property protection, facilitated business travel, stringent labor standards, and government procurement opportunities. The trading bloc consists primarily of middle powers: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.

The CPTPP’s main strength—and concurrent limitation—is the absence of China and the United States. This is a limitation because it excludes the two largest global markets. It is also a strength because the absence of these two powers shields the trading bloc from the erosion of the institutional trade framework under the current U.S. administration’s bilateral focus and from China’s geopolitical ambitions.

Importantly, the CPTPP’s provisions serve as a modern, high‑standard template for global governance that surpasses the often‑stalled frameworks of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is narrowly focused on trade and depends on consensus for its internal organization. Specific rules—such as those on digital trade, state‑owned enterprises (SOEs), and regulatory coherence—establish a predictable and transparent environment for international commerce.

The Geopolitical and Value‑Based Core

The strategic context for the CPTPP is defined by two undesirable trends impacting the rules‑based system: erosion by U.S. strategic withdrawal and challenge from China. The current U.S. administration’s hesitation to take on a global leadership role and its focus on immediate, protectionist interests—as evident in the rapid implementation of blanket tariffs—has undermined the system it historically guarded. The most direct evidence of this step back was the U.S. withdrawal from the original Trans‑Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement on January 23, 2017.

China is attempting to fill this leadership gap by promoting a global system that advances its own interests and political ideology. This effort includes funding massive infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and promoting alternative financial bodies like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to create parallel governance structures. This vision emphasizes strict state sovereignty and non‑interference, directly challenging the liberal norm that embeds democracy and human rights into international relations.

While the CPTPP was formed primarily to facilitate trade, it is also a value‑based bloc, united by a desire to resolve disputes peacefully and maintain a rules‑based global order. The partnership between established democracies and emerging democracies creates opportunities to strengthen democratic institutions through trade and diplomacy. The only two non‑democracies—Vietnam and Brunei—joined as original signatories, while future accessions are overwhelmingly expected to be democracies, reinforcing the bloc’s long‑term liberal alignment.

An Ambitious, Value‑Based Expansion

To succeed in maintaining the current global system of established norms, the CPTPP must embark on an ambitious, value‑based expansion. This includes countries in the Americas, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.

The European Union (EU) is another important potential member. Its large market size and compatible core values make it a natural fit. However, the EU’s stringent regulatory frameworks have strained trading relations in the past. To pave the road for EU accession, a sustained and collaborative approach is needed to reconcile the CPTPP’s high‑standard rules with the EU’s historic regulatory autonomy. There are positive signs that this gap can be closed, such as the inaugural 2025 Trade and Investment Dialogue between the two blocs.

Internal Cohesion and Future Resilience

While the CPTPP offers a robust framework, its effectiveness depends on maintaining internal cohesion. Potential challenges include differences in domestic standards, such as labour and environmental regulations. Member states do not always share geopolitical priorities. It will be important to prevent these differences from negatively impacting trade relations. While the CPTPP includes a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism, its success relies on consistent and timely application to build confidence in the bloc’s legal framework.

By consistently maintaining its high‑standard rules and successfully integrating new members that commit to its values, the CPTPP can solidify its role as a vital pillar of multilateralism, ensuring that the global system of established norms remains resilient in a time of political upheaval.

By Farshid Keramat

In the complex and often theatrical world of international relations, diplomats and world leaders have long employed a broad range of tools to convey messages, build alliances, and project national identity. Beyond the carefully chosen words of speeches and the solemn signatures on treaties, a more subtle yet increasingly powerful form of communication is emerging: “fashion diplomacy.” This term describes the deliberate and strategic use of clothing, accessories, and style by political figures to articulate specific messages, signal ideological stances, cultivate goodwill, or even instigate subtle provocations on the global stage. The recent appearance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a vintage CCCP (USSR) sweater in Anchorage, Alaska, serves as a striking example of this emerging trend.

A Sweater’s Provocative Message

The image of a top diplomat from Moscow wearing the emblem of the Soviet Union upon arrival in Alaska carries historical and geopolitical significance. As reported by news outlets, the wardrobe choice was widely interpreted as a provocative statement, particularly given the location. The sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 remains a sensitive topic for some nationalist factions within Russia, who view the sale as a regrettable loss of territory. By wearing the CCCP sweater, Lavrov engaged in a deliberate act of symbolic messaging—subtly invoking this historical grievance while tapping into the Soviet nostalgia that the current Russian government has been promoting. The CCCP symbol has increasingly been re‑appropriated to signify Russia’s past might and its desire to reclaim global prominence.

The Soft Power of Style

While Lavrov’s sweater represents assertive fashion diplomacy, the practice is more often used to build bridges and foster positive diplomatic relations. First Ladies have long leveraged their wardrobe choices to great effect. Michelle Obama frequently showcased American designers and used her clothing to honour the heritage of visiting nations, enhancing her soft power. Jill Biden continued this tradition, choosing her inauguration outfit to symbolize national unity by blending the colours of both major political parties.

Beyond First Ladies, political leaders often engage in fashion diplomacy during international engagements. Wearing traditional clothing of a host country is a well‑established practice that signifies cultural sensitivity and respect. Colours and symbols can also carry significant weight, expressing solidarity during crises or subtly supporting a particular cause. These instances of soft power demonstrate fashion’s ability to transcend language barriers and communicate shared identity and mutual understanding.

From Subtle Signals to Blatant Statements

The spectrum of fashion diplomacy ranges from subtle signals to bold, unmistakable statements. Queen Elizabeth II was known for her carefully chosen ornamental pins, each carrying historical or diplomatic meaning. On the other end of the spectrum, Melania Trump’s infamous “I Really Don’t Care, Do U?” jacket became a flashpoint of controversy. While her spokesperson initially denied any hidden message, the First Lady later clarified in an ABC News interview that the jacket was intended as a message to critics. This episode highlights how fashion can be used as a blunt and provocative form of communication.

The Future of International Relations: Why Fashion Matters

As the world becomes increasingly digital and visual, the role of fashion diplomacy will only grow. In a media‑saturated environment, a single striking image can convey a message more powerfully than carefully crafted words. Understanding the subtle language of clothing and style in international relations is becoming essential for diplomats, political analysts, and engaged citizens. The seemingly simple act of choosing what to wear can be a deliberate and impactful tool in shaping perceptions, signaling intentions, and influencing global affairs. The world stage is increasingly becoming a runway where fashion choices speak louder than words.

By Farshid Keramat

For years, the conventional wisdom among political and economic leaders has been that expanded global trade leads to peace. This belief, rooted in liberal theory, suggests that countries with strong economic ties are less likely to go to war. However, in an increasingly competitive world, this idea is being challenged. Trade is no longer simply a neutral economic activity; it has become a powerful tool of national strategy.

The Strategic Imperative of Trade Policy

The long-standing economic partnership between the United States (U.S.) and China offers a clear example of this new reality. While Americans have enjoyed the benefits of inexpensive goods from China, this engagement has also contributed to China’s emergence as a major global power and military competitor. Since the 1990s, Beijing’s economic growth has funded a significant expansion of its armed forces and a shift toward manufacturing its own advanced military technology. This transition marks a critical strategic development.

Beijing’s Growing Regional and Global Influence

China’s assertive stance on the international stage presents a direct challenge to global stability. Its broad claims over the South China Sea—a vital waterway for nearly a quarter of all global trade—are both legally questionable and a source of ongoing tension. Combined with long-held ambitions toward Taiwan, this creates a potential flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. officials have openly warned of the “devastating consequences” of a conflict. Meanwhile, China’s strengthening ties with Russia, Iran, and North Korea signal a coordinated effort to undermine Western leadership.

National Security Implications

For the U.S., these geopolitical shifts mean that control over critical supply routes could be weaponized by an adversary, posing a genuine national security risk. While the U.S. has built a robust network of security alliances in Asia, the effectiveness of these partnerships depends on stable economic relationships. Today, trade policy is not just about GDP—it is a source of geopolitical leverage.

A New Framework for Trade

The United States and other established democracies need to redefine their approach to global commerce. Instead of forging deeper economic ties with geopolitical rivals, they should prioritize partnerships with developing democracies that share their values, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. These nations offer strong manufacturing capabilities and political alignment. By reorienting supply chains toward these partners, established democracies can enhance both economic resilience and strategic positioning.

Past agreements like the US‑Mexico‑Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‑Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) demonstrate that trade can be a tool for diplomacy and political stability. While a full economic separation from China will be gradual, current global events make beginning this realignment an urgent necessity.

Trade as an Instrument of Democratic Resilience

In the modern world, trade policy must be built on the principles of resilience, shared values, and strategic foresight. To protect their democratic institutions and promote global stability, developed countries must integrate trade and national security into a single, cohesive strategy.

By Farshid Keramat

Editor’s Note: This article is a condensed policy digest. The full, unabridged analysis was originally published by the Diplomatist. You can read the complete article here.

India and China are two ancient civilizations with histories stretching back millennia. Today, they find themselves in a modern rivalry shaped by ideology, geopolitics, and ambition. While both nations have expanded their global influence, their relationship remains defined more by competition than cooperation.

The Ideological Divide

At the core of the Sino‑Indian rivalry is an ideological divide. India, the world’s largest democracy, prides itself on its pluralistic political system, public discourse, and institutional checks and balances. While imperfect, India’s democratic institutions encourage compromise and public participation.

China, by contrast, operates under a one‑party authoritarian regime founded on communist ideology. The Chinese Communist Party maintains legitimacy through economic success and global influence rather than popular consensus. Its governance model prioritizes efficiency and strategic control over democratic participation.

These contrasting political identities shape their foreign policy approaches. India leans toward multilateralism and diplomacy, seeking to avoid military confrontation. China, in contrast, pursues an assertive, goal‑oriented diplomacy, using international relations as a tool to advance its strategic interests.

Diverging Foreign Policy Objectives

China’s foreign policy is driven by expansionist ambitions. Its territorial claims in the Himalayas—particularly in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh—are rooted in historical narratives such as Mao Zedong’s “five fingers of Tibet” analogy. The 1951 annexation of Tibet and continued influence in the region remain major sources of tension.

Beyond the Himalayas, China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea and its stated goal of annexing Taiwan reflect a broader pattern of uncompromising diplomacy. Artificial islands, military installations, and disregard for international rulings have drawn global criticism. India watches these developments with growing unease. Diplomatic dialogue has yielded little progress, and the 2020 Galwan Valley clash marked a sharp escalation in tensions.

Shared Goals and Global Platforms

Despite tensions, several shared priorities offer opportunities for cooperation. Both nations pursue poverty reduction, environmental sustainability, and infrastructure development. At the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to these goals.

Within BRICS and through institutions like the New Development Bank, India and China have collaborated on development initiatives. Environmental stewardship is another area of convergence, with both countries participating in global climate frameworks.

Geopolitically, both support a multipolar world order and have expressed dissatisfaction with Western dominance. Their 2006 Joint Declaration emphasized their role as “major countries in the emerging multi‑polar global order.” However, China has stopped short of endorsing India’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat.

Integration Without Trust

Economic interdependence has not translated into diplomatic stability. India faces a trade deficit with China nearing $100 billion, raising concerns about economic dependence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while embraced by many nations, is viewed by India as a strategic tool for expanding Chinese influence.

Pragmatism Over Idealism

To manage this complex relationship, both nations must recalibrate their strategies. China could benefit from revisiting Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic foreign policy of the 1980s, which emphasized stability and cooperation. De‑escalating border tensions and adopting a more collaborative approach would help build trust.

India, meanwhile, should pursue realistic engagement. Recognizing that structural differences are unlikely to be resolved under China’s current leadership, India must assert its interests confidently while maintaining a non‑violent posture. Strengthening ties with Himalayan neighbors and deepening partnerships with other democracies could help counterbalance Chinese influence.

India must also accept that China will prioritize its core interests over shared values. When foreign policy agendas collide, China is unlikely to compromise.

Cooperation Amidst Rivalry

India and China share large populations, rapid economic growth, regional power status, and a vision for a multipolar world. Yet these commonalities have not been enough to overcome entrenched differences. Ideological divides, territorial disputes, and conflicting foreign policy goals continue to prevent a meaningful strategic partnership. Diplomatic gestures may keep dialogue alive, but the underlying rivalry remains firmly in place.

By Farshid Keramat

Editor’s Note: This article is a condensed policy digest. The full, unabridged analysis was originally published by the Diplomatist. You can read the complete article here.

President Trump’s tariff strategy, aimed at revitalizing American manufacturing, continues to spark debate across economic and political circles. While the intent is clear, the broader implications raise important questions about its alignment with long‑term economic trends.

From Factory Floors to a Service Economy

The U.S. manufacturing sector has steadily shrunk over the past five decades, falling from 23% of GDP in 1970 to just 9.7% in early 2025. Job losses have followed suit, prompting concern among policymakers and workers alike. Yet this decline is not unique to the United States—similar patterns are evident in Canada, Germany, and Japan.

Economists point to a natural evolution in advanced economies: agriculture gives way to manufacturing, which is eventually overtaken by services. In the U.S., the service sector has expanded from 71.8% of GDP in 1997 to 83.7% in 2025, driving employment growth and contributing to a low unemployment rate of 4.1%. While this figure suggests economic strength, it also signals potential inflationary pressure due to tight labor markets.

Targeted Industrial Policy Over Blanket Tariffs

Certain industries—such as steel, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals—carry national security weight. However, targeted investments and regulatory reforms may be more effective than blanket tariffs. Canada’s post‑pandemic vaccine strategy, which relied on coordinated public investment rather than protectionist measures, offers a compelling case study.

Consumer Costs and Supply Chain Friction

Tariffs often come with unintended consequences. The U.S.–China trade tensions between 2018 and 2020 led to an estimated $48 billion in added costs for American consumers and manufacturers in 2019 alone, according to the Federal Reserve. These figures highlight the ripple effects on domestic supply chains and consumer prices.

Fracturing Bilateral Alliances

Beyond economics, tariffs risk straining relationships with key allies. Canada, for instance, may respond with reciprocal measures, potentially harming industries on both sides of the border. Trade disputes can also spill into broader foreign policy arenas, complicating international cooperation.

Balancing Service Growth with Selective Capacity

The evidence suggests that embracing the service economy while selectively supporting strategic manufacturing sectors may offer a more sustainable path. This approach aligns with economic realities while preserving diplomatic goodwill—particularly with close partners like Canada.

By Farshid Keramat

Editor’s Note: This article is a condensed policy digest. The original, full-length analysis was published by The Hill Times. Read the complete article here.